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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the results of a laboratory study involv-
ing Mailvelope, a modern PGP client that integrates tightly
with existing webmail providers. In our study, we brought
in pairs of participants and had them attempt to use Mailve-
lope to communicate with each other. Our results shown that
more than a decade and a half after Why Johnny Can’t En-
crypt, modern PGP tools are still unusable for the masses.
We finish with a discussion of pain points encountered using
Mailvelope, and discuss what might be done to address them
in future PGP systems.
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(e.g. HCI): User Interfaces—user-centered design
INTRODUCTION
Usable, secure email is still an open problem more than 15
years after it was first studied by Whitten et al. [10]. Six
years after the original Johnny paper, Sheng et al. showed
that PGP 9 was still difficult for users to operate correctly [9].
In this paper, we attempt to see if in the last decade, modern
PGP-based tools have improved to the point where users can
successfully send encrypted email.
We elected to test Mailvelope, a modern PGP tool, for our
study. Mailvelope is a browser extension that integrates with
users’ webmail systems. It is the only system currently being
promoted by the EFF’s secure message score card1 that in-
tegrates with users’ webmail providers, an important feature
for many users. It is also highly rated on the Chrome Web
Store, with 242 users collectively giving it 4.6 out of 5 stars.
In our own testing of PGP alternatives, we found Mailvelope
to be roughly as usable as other alternatives (i.e., GPG Tools,
Enigmail, Google’s End-to-End Encryption).
1https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard
In our study of 20 participants, grouped into 10 pairs of par-
ticipants who attempted to exchange encrypted email, only
one pair was able to successfully complete the assigned tasks
using Mailvelope. All other participants were unable to com-
plete the assigned task in the one hour allotted to the study.
This demonstrates that encrypting email with PGP, as imple-
mented in Mailvelope, is still unusable for the masses.
Our results also shed light on several ways that PGP-based
tools could be improved. First, integrated tutorials would
be helpful in assisting first time users in knowing what they
should be doing at any given point in time. Second, an ap-
proachable description of public key cryptography could help
users correctly manage their own keys. Third, in line with
previous work by Atwater et al. [1], we find that PGP-based
tools would be well served by offering automatically gener-
ated emails for unknown recipients asking them to install the
PGP software, generate a public key, and share it with the
sender. Finally, the PGP block itself could be enhanced to
help non-PGP users who receive an encrypted email know
how to work with their friend to get an encrypted message
they will be able to read.
RELATED WORK
Whitten and Tygar [10] conducted the first formal user study
of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5), uncovering serious us-
ability issues with key management and users’ understanding
of the underlying public key cryptography. It was found that a
majority of users were unable to successfully send encrypted
email in the context of a hypothetical political campaign sce-
nario. The results of the study took the security community
by surprise and became responsible for shaping modern us-
able security research. Sheng at al. demonstrated that despite
improvements made to PGP in the seven years since Whitten
and Tygar’s original publication, key management was still
a challenge for users. Furthermore, they showed that in the
new version of PGP encryption and decryption had become
so transparent that users were unsure if a message they re-
ceived had actually been encrypted.
While there have been some attempts at implementing email
using key escrow [6, 7], these approaches have degraded se-
curity when compared to traditional PGP. Atwater et al. cre-
ated a mock-up of Mailvelope that automated key creation
and sharing. This approach falls somewhere in between tra-
ditional PGP and key escrow on the spectrum of usability and
security tradeoffs. Unfortunately, it was not possible to in-
clude Atwater et al.’s mock-up in our study, as we discovered
that it relied on hard-coded keys for email recipients, and the
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effort required to implement a working key management sys-
tem into their mock-up would have exceeded our resources.
Furthermore, the mock-up did not correctly simulate the need
for participants to wait on the recipient to set up keys, which
made the mock-up incompatible with our study.2
METHODOLOGY
We conducted an IRB-approved user study wherein pairs of
participants used secure email to transmit sensitive informa-
tion to each other. This section gives an overview of the study
and describes the scenario, tasks, study questionnaire, and
post-study interview. In addition, we discuss how the study
was developed and its limitations.
Study Setup
The study ran for two weeks, beginning Tuesday, Septem-
ber 8, 2015 and ending Friday, September 18, 2015. In to-
tal, 10 pairs of participants (20 total participants) completed
the study. Participants were allocated sixty minutes to com-
plete the study, with about 35-40 minutes spent using Mail-
velope. Participants were compensated $15 USD for their
participation. Participants were required to be accompanied
by a friend, who served as their counterpart for the study.
For standardization and requirements of the systems tested
in the study, both participants were required to have Gmail
accounts.
When participants arrived, they were read a brief introduction
detailing the study and their rights as participants. Partici-
pants were informed that they would be in in separate rooms
during the study and would use email to communicate with
each other.3 Participants were also informed that a study co-
ordinator would be with them at all times, and could answer
questions they might have.
Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university.
Participants were two-thirds male: male (13; 65%), female
(7; 35%). Participants skewed young: 18 – 24 years old (18;
90%), 25 – 34 years old (2; 10%).
We distributed posters broadly across campus to avoid biasing
our results to any particular major. All participants were uni-
versity students,4 with the majority being undergraduate stu-
dents: undergraduate students (17; 85%), graduate students
(3; 15%).
Scenario and Task Design
During the study, participants were asked to role-play a sce-
nario regarding completing taxes. Participant A was told they
needed Participant B’s help with filing taxes. Participant A
was also told they since they were sending sensitive informa-
tion (e.g., SSN) that they should encrypt this information us-
ing Mailvelope.5 Participant B was told to wait for his friend
2This incorrect simulation also calls into question their results re-
garding the high usability of automated-PGP.
3The study coordinators ensured that the participants knew each
other’s email addresses.
4We did not require this.
5Participants used sensitive information we generated and not their
own information.
to send him the necessary sensitive information (e.g., SSN).
Once Participant B had received this information, he was in-
structed to use Mailvelope to respond to Participant A with a
confirmation code (encrypted using Mailvelope) to conclude
the task.
After the instructions were given, Participant A was provided
with the the Mailvelope website and instructed to begin the
task.6 While participants waited for email from each other,
they were told that they could browse the Internet, use their
phones, or engage in other similar activities. This was done
to provide a more natural setting for the participants, as well
as to avoid frustration if participants had to wait for an ex-
tended period of time while their friends figured out how to
use Mailvelope.7
Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related
to the study, but were not allowed to provide instructions on
how to use Mailvelope. If participants became stuck and
asked for help, they were told that they could take whatever
steps they normally would to solve a similar problem, in-
cluding using an Internet search service. Additionally, when
asked for help, if the study coordinator believed communi-
cation between the two parties could help, study coordina-
tors could remind participants that they were completing this
study with their friend and were free to communicate with
their friend however they wanted, and that only the sensitive
information was required to be transmitted over secure email.
Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-based sur-
vey software. Before beginning the survey, participants were
read an introduction by the study coordinator and then asked
to answer a set of demographic questions. Participants then
completed the study task.
Immediately upon completing the study task, participants
were asked several questions related to their experience with
that system. First, participants completed the ten System Us-
ability System questions [4, 5]. Second, participants were
also asked to describe in their own words what they liked
about Mailvelope, what they would change, and why they
would change it. If Participant B had never received an en-
crypted email from Participant A, they were not required to
complete the study questionnaire, as they had no experience
with Mailvelope.
Post-study Interview
After the completion of the survey, participants were inter-
viewed by their respective study coordinators. Study coordi-
nators focused on issues that had arisen during the study and
probed for more details regarding areas of confusion. After
the participants completed their individual post-study inter-
views, they were brought together for a final post-study in-
terview. Participants were asked to explain what they had
experienced to each other, and notes were taken on what
was said by the study coordinators. Additionally, participants
6https://www.mailvelope.com/
7In some cases Participant B never actually received an email from
Participant A.
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Participant A 10 30.5 16.6 0.0 21.3 28.8 41.3 57.5
Participant B 6 41.3 10.9 27.5 33.75 41.3 16.9 57.5
Combined 16 34.5 15.3 0.0 25.0 35.0 45.6 57.5
Table 1. SUS Scores
were asked how an ideal secure email system would function.
While participants are not system designers, our experience
has shown that when asked to design ideal systems, partici-
pants often reveal preferences that otherwise remain unspo-
ken.
Survey Development and Limitations
After developing the study, we conducted a pilot study with
three pairs of participants (six participants total). Based on
the results of the pilot study, we printed out the task instruc-
tions and provided them to the participants to reference while
completing the study.
Our study only included twenty participants, all of whom
were students. While this was enough to show difficulties
associated with Mailveope it is not indicative of all possi-
ble outcomes. It would be especially interesting to rerun this
study using different populations (e.g., technical profession-
als, computer scientists, security professionals). Future stud-
ies could also be conducted to see how Mailvelope fares when
some of its more glaring problems are addressed.
RESULTS
In this section, we report on the SUS scores for Mailvelope,
provide details on the success rate, and list the mistakes made
by participants.
System Usability Scale
We evaluated Mailvelope using the System Usability Scale
(SUS). A breakdown of the SUS score for each system and
type of participant (i.e., Participant A, Participant B, or com-
bined) is given in Table 1. The mean value is used as the SUS
score [4].
To give greater context to the meaning of each system’s
SUS score, we leverage the work of several researchers who
analyzed hundreds of studies which used SUS in order to
give adjective-based ratings describing SUS scores [2, 3, 8].
Based on this data, we generated ranges for these adjective
ratings, such that a score is correlated with the adjective it is
closest to in terms of standard deviations (see Figure 1). Us-
ing these ratings, Mailvelope’s SUS score of 34.5 is rated as
having “Poor” usability. It falls below the 15th percentile, is
given a letter grade of “F” and is labeled as “Not acceptable”.
Failures
Participants were given between 30 and 45 minutes to com-
plete the tasks. Study coordinators were instructed to end
the task if thirty minutes elapsed after Participant A had first
installed Mailvelope. If participants were making progress,
study coordinators would allow them to go up to ten minutes
longer, as long as it did not cause the overall study time to
exceed one hour.
Of the ten participant pairs, nine were unable to successfully
complete the task. In two of the nine pairs, participants A
never figured out how to use Mailvelope to send any mes-
sage. In another two pairs, Participant B was completely mys-
tified by the encrypted PGP email and was unaware that they
needed to install Mailvelope to read the message. Only one
of the nine pairs actually traded public keys, though this pair
was still confused about what to do after sharing their public
keys.
The one pair that did complete the task required the full forty-
five minutes to do so. The successful pair was unique in that
they were the only pair of participants where one of the partic-
ipants had previously learned about public key cryptography.
It is likely that this heavily influenced their ability to finish
within the time limit.
Mistakes
All participant pairs made mistakes. The most common mis-
take was encrypting a message with the sender’s public key.
This occurred for seven of the participant pairs, including for
the participant pair that was eventually successful. Three of
the participant pairs generated a key pair with their friend in-
formation, and then tried to use that public key to encrypt
their message. One participant modified the PGP block after
encryption (while still in the PGP compose window), adding
their sensitive information to the area before the PGP block.
Finally, one participant eventually exported his private key
and sent it along with his keyring password to his friend so
that his friend could decrypt the message he had received. In
this case, even though the participants had transmitted the re-
quired information, they were informed that they needed to
try some more and accomplish the task without sending the
private key.
DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss themes we found while running
this study and include quotes from participants. Participants
have all been assigned a unique identifier M[1-10][A,B]. The
final letter refers to which role the participant played during
the study, and participants with the same number were paired
with each other (e.g., M1A and M1B were Participant A and
Participant B, respectively, in the same study session).
Mailvelope clearly failed to help the majority of participants
encrypt their email. All participants expressed frustration
with Mailvelope, with the most comical expression of this
frustration coming from M3A: “Imagine the stupidest soft-
ware you would ever use, and that was what I was doing.”.
The difficulty also led several participants to indicate that in
the real world they would have given up trying to use Mail-
velope long before they did during the study. For example,
M3A also said, “After five minutes, I would have just given
up and called.”
While it is unclear if PGP will ever be usable by the masses,
we spend the remainder of this section reporting lessons
Figure 1. Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores
learned from the study that could assist the design of PGP-
based secure email tools.
Integrated Tutorials
Every single participant constantly flipped back and forth be-
tween Gmail and Mailvelope’s instructions. At no stage was
it intuitive what they should do next based on the Mailvelope
UI. Nearly all participants indicated that they wished Mail-
velope had provided instructions that were integrated with
the Mailvelope software, and would walk them through, step-
by-step, in setting up Mailvelope and sending their first en-
crypted email. This has been shown to greatly improve the
usability of other secure email systems [7], and would greatly
assist first-time users in acclimating to PGP.
Key steps that could be addressed by tutorials are: (1) helping
participants generate their PGP key pair, (2) discussing how
to share public keys, (3) inviting their friends to setup Mail-
velope, (4) importing their friend’s public keys, (5) sending
their first encrypted email, and (6) decrypting their first en-
crypted email.
Explanation of Public Key Cryptography
The only participant pair that successfully completed the
study task likely did so because one of the participants in the
pair had previous knowledge related to public key cryptogra-
phy. Additionally, the only other pair that made progress did
so because they realized that they needed each other’s public
keys, but even that pair did not know how to then use those
shared public keys. For the remaining eight participant pairs,
the post-study interview made it clear that they did not under-
stand how public and private keys were used.
To help address this, a simple explanation of PGP needs to
be created that is accessible to the masses. Several partici-
pants indicated that they would prefer these concepts to be
displayed in a simple video. Ideally, whatever form the de-
scription takes, it would be be integrated with the tutorials,
allowing new users to be introduced to public key cryptogra-
phy as a natural extension of their usage of Mailvelope.
Automatic Email Invites for Recipients
All participants in the Participant A role were confused about
what their friend needed to do in order for their friend to
receive encrypted email. An easy way to address this issue
would be to modify PGP-based tools to send an email to re-
cipients for which there isn’t an associated public key, asking
that individual to install the appropriate software, generate a
key pair, and reply with the public key. This technique was
also suggested by Atwater et al. [1] and our experience cor-
roborates their suggestions.
Better Text to Accompany PGP Block
When first seeing the PGP block generated by Mailvelope,
no participant in the Participant B role was clear what they
were supposed to do with it. One participant noted that they
thought it was an image that had gotten garbled during email
transmission. The one participant that managed to success-
fully use Mailvelope, M10B, even stated, “It was like a puz-
zle, I only got a link to Mailvelope. I then had to go there and
explore.”
To address this issue, PGP-based tools could adopt a tech-
nique used by other secure email tools: including plaintext
instructions detailing the nature of the encrypted email and
how to decrypt it [7]. While it is true that instructions on how
to decrypt the message are meaningless—as PGP-based tools
can only encrypt messages for a recipient who has already es-
tablished and shared their public key with the sender—there is
still room for instructions helping the unexpected recipient of
an encrypted email know what to do next. These instructions
could invite the recipient to install the PGP software, gener-
ate a key pair, and then send their public key to their friend.
While these instructions aren’t foolproof, they are certainly a
positive improvement to the current situation.
CONCLUSION
We studied Mailvelope, a browser-based PGP secure email
tool that integrates tightly with users’ existing webmail
providers. In our study of 20 participants, grouped into 10
pairs of participants who attempted to exchange encrypted
email, only one pair was able to successfully complete the
assigned tasks using Mailvelope. All other participants were
unable to complete the assigned task in the one hour allotted
to the study. Even though a decade has passed since the last
formal study of PGP [9], our results show that Johnny has still
not gotten any closer to encrypt his email using PGP.
While our results are disheartening, we also discuss several
ways that participant experiences and responses indicate how
PGP could be improved. First, integrated tutorials could help
first time users with step-by-step instructions. Second, an
approachable description of public key cryptography would
give novice individuals a “fighting chance” at using PGP.
Third, PGP-based tools would be more effective if, when en-
countering an unknown recipient, the recipient were to be au-
tomatically sent an email telling them what they needed to do
receive encrypted email. Finally, the PGP block itself could
be prefixed with instructions that would help non-PGP users
understand how to overcome the problem of receiving an en-
crypted message that they can’t decrypt.
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